Crisis in Bolivia’s Public Universities

When Evo Morales came to office in 2006, he cut the presidential salary in half and passed a law prohibiting public officials from earning any more than he did.  Against a historical background of elected officials lining their pockets with funds from the public treasury, the move appeared reasonable, perhaps even noble.  Assuming the salary is at least sufficient to meet basic needs, a cap of this sort may serve as a way to screen out opportunists and ensure that those seeking employment with the government are doing so out of a genuine desire to serve the public.

Of course, Evo has tons of perks that ordinary government workers don’t have.  So while the salary is more than enough to support the President’s needs, it often fails to satisfy for those not living in the Presidential Palace.  To make up the difference, public workers, especially university professors, have picked up other jobs.  So far so good.  If the jobs are within the private sector, there is no issue.  But if the second job is also a public job–say, a medical professor who works in a public hospital or a law professor who moonlights as a judge–things get tricky.  According to the government’s interpretation, the law demands that the salaries of these two public jobs be combined.  If the sum exceeds the President’s draw, the individual is in violation.

With this in mind, Cochabamba’s main public university, Universidad Mayor de San Simon (UMSS), fears it may lose half of its professors.  To avoid the limitations of the financial law, so the theory goes, these professors would seek employment with private universities.   With some 60,000 students enrolled at UMSS, this would be a serious blow to public education in Cochabamba.  Presumably a similar dynamic would occur in Bolivia’s other public universities.

I’m not sure how I come down on all this, but I definitely think it merits some serious thought.  Any initial reactions?

Morales Continues to Push Claim to Pacific

Meeting on Saturday in Buenos Aires, Bolivian President Evo Morales and Chilean head of state Sebastián Piñera continued their running conversation regarding Bolivia’s claim to coastal territory.  The two leaders continue to disagree, though Piñera says he remains open to dialogue.

Ever since the War of the Pacific came to a close in 1883, Bolivia has been a landlocked country.  The war with Chile saw Bolivia lose the Antofogasta Territory, a bleak but mineral-rich stretch of coastline that now marks the northern reaches of Chile.  Bolivians have always longed to recover their coast, but political realities and the march of history have gotten in the way.

Over the last few years, though, President Morales has conducted a high-profile publicity campaign to regain the lost territory or at least an access corridor leading to the Pacific Ocean.  He has threatened litigation, including a possible case before The Hague.  Many wonder whether this is a serious threat, or whether Morales sees the Pacific claim as an easy way to play the hero, winning popular support among Bolivians without ever seriously considering litigation.  Perhaps time will tell.  In any event, Bolivia’s chances of winning in court seem quite slim.

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U.S. unfreezes Goni extradition request

Contemplated in the document signed by Bolivia and the U.S. about a month ago–which also saw the two nations reestablish diplomatic relations–the U.S. and Bolivia have kicked off discussions regarding the possible extradition of fomer Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, popularly known as “Goni.”  The Morales administration has sought his extradition for years now on charges of genocide and financial crimes.  Even though Bolivia signed an extradition treaty with the U.S. in 1995, the U.S. has so far refused the extradition request, citing a clause that prohibits extradition for “political” reasons.  

The warming of relations between the U.S. and Bolivia is quite interesting.  It’s dangerous to read too much into it, but the timing–this all started to happen shortly after the TIPNIS crisis–raises questions:  Has Morales softened his position vis-a-vis the U.S. out of a recognition that his international and domestic clout has been diminished?  Does the U.S. perceive a regime change in the near future (perhaps in the next round of elections), such that it is aiming to lay the groundwork for a more fruitful relationship with the next Bolivian president?    Food for thought.

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La Paz and Washington Restore Full Diplomatic Ties

As of Monday, Bolivia and the U.S. are back to a normal diplomatic relationship.  This news marks an end to the three-year semi-estrangement during which Bolivia had kicked out the U.S. ambassador and Washington had down the same to the representative from La Paz.  A U.S. representative said the countries plan to exchange ambassadors again as soon as possible.  Although Los Tiempos reports that anti-drug cooperation is on the agenda, President Morales confirmed that the DEA will not be allowed back in the country.  DEA activity in Bolivia has always been the subject of much controversy, and Evo himself claims to have been the victim of DEA-directed violence when he was the leader of the cocaleros’ union.

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Protests Here, Protests There: Mass Demonstrations and the State of Democracy in the U.S. & Bolivia

The International Affairs Forum was kind enough to publish this piece I put together on the use and effect of mass demonstrations in the U.S. and Bolivia.  Here are the first couple of paragraphs for those who are interested:

Bolivia has been called a “weak democracy.” 1 In some sense, that’s probably right. But if democracy implies power held by the people, this accusation may go too far. In Bolivia, mass protests win results. Take the recent case of the government’s attempt to construct a freeway through a national park and protected indigenous territory. Despite years of planning and a $400-million contract with Brazil, the administration in La Paz scrapped the plan after a small march swelled into country-wide demonstrations, road blockades, and chants for the President’s resignation. To be sure, the government made mistakes along the way—including an incident of police brutality—that weakened its position and enflamed the public even further. But regardless of these mistakes, it appeared all along as though the people would win out.2 At least on issues of critical importance, the public in Bolivia is not afraid to hold the government accountable. And the government, whether accurately or not, perceives that it has no choice but to bow to public sentiment.

Travel north 4,000 miles to Zuccotti Park, and things look radically different. The people gathered there clearly believe they have the capacity to inspire change through protest, but there are few among them who expect a Bolivian-style response from the government. Indeed, many (perhaps most) expect just the opposite: Washington to ignore them as best it can until, if the demonstrators are lucky, the government introduces some minor, incremental reform. They might wish for more, but, deep down, they doubt this will happen. And even if a fair chunk of the demonstrators do believe they can effect fundamental change through protest, their optimism is drowned out by the skepticism that prevails among the public at large. The U.S. government just isn’t that responsive. Voters overwhelmingly supported a public health-care option that never came. They opposed the bank bail-outs delivered in October 2008. Al Gore lost the presidential election despite winning the popular vote. Recent history has taught us that public opinion does not control U.S. policy or even the make-up of our government.

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Breaking: Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega Looks to Win Third Term

The New York Times has the story here.

A Peek Inside Bolivia’s Federalism Project

One of the major policy shifts inaugurated through the 2009 Constitution was increased departmental autonomy.  Under the Constitution,  departmental autonomy “implies the direct election of the department’s authorities by its citizens, the administration of its economic resources, and the organization of its legislative, regulatory, fiscal, and executive faculties within the scope of its jurisdiction.”  Constitution of Bolivia, Art. 272.  According to good friend and Political Science Professor Neyer Zapata (Universidad Mayor de San Simon), the federalism envisioned by the Constitution is not so robust as that existing in the United States but it still marks a major departure from the traditional, heavily centralized model that has dominated most of Bolivia’s history.  The national government passed a law in July 2010 establishing the process for this experiment in federalism, and it now falls upon the departments to decide exactly what their individual autonomy statutes will look like.

Dr. Neyer Zapata contemplates the proceedings at yesterday's town-hall meeting.

Yesterday, I had the honor of attending a meeting between citizens and members of the newly established Legislative Assembly of the Department of Cochabamba.  The Legislative Assembly has the task of writing the statute, but it is seeking input from citizens along the way.  In fact, the Assembly has organized a massive campaign of town-hall-style meetings with different sectors of the population to hear citizens’ thoughts.  The Assembly is receiving citizen demands and comments in both written and spoken form.  Though it’s a monumental task, the Assembly seems to be making a dedicated effort to hear from all sectors of the community and respond to their points of view.

Sign welcoming the public near Beijing and Blanco Galindo in Cochabamba.

Yesterday’s meeting focused on the concerns of OTBs (Organizacion Territorial de Base).  OTBs are basically neighborhood organizations; they respond to citizen concerns regarding day-to-day matters like access to water, trash service, and road conditions.   A creature of law, the OTBs have been around since the mid-90s, and they have established themselves as an important institution and intermediary between citizens and the higher realms of government.

At the moment, the OTBs are very concerned of being left out of local administration.  The Constitution does not mention the OTBs per se, and there has been speculation that they may not be recognized in the departmental autonomy statutes.  The OTB representatives at yesterday’s meeting were unified in their position:  They would not be left out of the process without a fight. However, the Legislative Assembly was equally clear in its response:  The OTBs would not be excluded, they would be recognized in one form or another as an important institution, and the Assembly would do all it could to leverage OTB resources.

The President of the Legislative Assembly receives written comments from the OTBs of Cochabamba Comunas 3 and 4.

The President of the Legislative Assembly reassures the OTBs that the goal is cooperation and not displacement.

It looks like I may have the opportunity to follow the drafting of the Cochabamba autonomy statute in some detail.  Look for follow-up posts on this topic, and if anyone has specific concerns, please let me know in the comments.  I’m just an observer, but I may have the chance to express a concern or two to folks with some influence.

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The Ugly Side of Community Justice

A few days ago, a man and a woman were burned to death in El Alto by a mob of angry neighbors.  The article is short on details, but the couple were suspected of committing various crimes in the neighborhood.  Residents took matters into their own hands, torching the house where the couple and three others lived.  Will there be legal consequences for the vigilantes?  Your guess is as good as mine.

Events like this are all too common in Bolivia.   The problem has many causes, but three factors jump out as particularly significant: (1) lack of police; (2) corruption among the police; and (3) the legitimization of “community justice” under the new constitution.

The first two factors are nothing new.  There simply isn’t enough money for an adequate police force.  This means people commit crimes with impunity–running a red light hardly even raises an eye-brow–and victims don’t bother calling the police because they suspect an insufficient response.  Then there is the issue of corruption.   Part of the problem stems from an inadequate salary:  Those men and women who are in uniform are paid so little that bribery has become a standard way of supplementing one’s income.  I don’t want to paint with too broad a brush here — there are clearly many, many officers who do their jobs well and without the taint of corruption — but corruption is a very serious issue in Bolivia.  So there’s one more reason to consider self-help.

The third causal factor–legitimization of community justice–is more complicated.  The new constitution, adopted in 2009, recognized traditional community justice as a legitimate response to crime.  This shift in policy was pitched as part of the decolonization process:  Why should the legal practices inherited from the Spanish be the only ones recognized as legitimate?  Indigenous communities have their own traditional ways of doling out punishment, and those practices should be respected.  Fair enough. That seems quite reasonable, assuming fundamental human rights are not violated.   The problem is, however, that community justice has not been well-defined.  Though I believe its intentions were good, the government has promoted a culture of vigilanteism by failing to carefully police this new concept of community justice.  The result?  Images like this are fairly common:

An effigy of warning for would-be criminals. Loosely translated, it reads: "The thief who is caught will be burned."

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Trip to Chapare

This past weekend saw my first trip to the Chapare, a tropical rainforest that occupies the eastern portion of the Department of Cochabamba.  Crossing over the Andes, the ecology quickly changes from a dry, temperate, sparsely vegetated landscape to one flush with intense green and oven-like heat.  Before you hit the real jungle, though, you cross through the cloud-forests.  High up, this region catches the last of the moisture rising from the Amazon plain and holds it there in the form of thick mists.  It’s dangerous driving but the views more than make up for the risk.

Crossing over the Andes on the road to Chapare, cloud forests dominate and offer distraction to the weary driver.

When you finally make it down to the valley floor and turn off the car engine, the sounds and sights overwhelm the senses.  Bird calls that sound like alien chatter, bugs the size of your palm stretched out under the lights (we arrived during the night), and vegetation in untold quantities stretching out to trip you up at every step.  It can be a bit scary at first.  You feel vulnerable, and it’s certainly humbling–so much life is packed into every square meter.

A typical scene in Cochabamba's Chapare region. Intensive cultivation of coca and illegal forestry are just two of the environmental issues facing the region.

Politically, the Chapare is a stronghold of support for the Morales administration.  This is quite evident, even to the casual observer, with MAS propaganda (not defaced for a change) festooned onto almost every other building.

The graffiti on this building reads "NGOs Out" and "Judicial Elections -- Yes." The MAS influence is clear: Evo recently blamed NGOs for fomenting the TIPNIS conflict, while judicial elections have been one of his administration's pet projects.

Chapare is also coca country, and that, at the moment, is cutting both ways for the Morales administration.  On the one hand, the cocaleros are some of Evo’s fiercest supporters.  On the other hand, this alliance has been shaken a bit by Evo’s decision to cancel the road through TIPNIS.  When we tried to pass through Villa Tunari, the main city in the region, we were stopped in our tracks by a road block set up by cocaleros.  They were halting all traffic from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz in protest of the government’s decision.  Although they must realize it would be political suicide for Evo to double-back at this point, the cocaleros are still sending a strong message to La Paz:  “We wanted that road,” they are saying.  “If we can’t have it, you better give us something else in return.”

Road block in Villa Tunari organized by cocaleros.

Blockades are a political tradition in Bolivia, and they are often effective.  However, I am beginning to question whether they are getting out of hand.  An occasional blockade for issues of critical importance may be the sign of a healthy democracy–of people who care about their government’s decision and who are willing to stand up when their government fails to act on their behalf.  But when blockades become commonplace and are used to flout the will of the majority, they may do more harm than good.  Just some thoughts.  I could be wrong.

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Wendell Berry on Work and Agriculture

As I refine my paper on soil conservation and rural culture, I’m finding much inspiration in the work of Wendell Berry.  For those who don’t know Mr. Berry, here’s a nice introduction:

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